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Rights without Resources:  
The Impact of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending 
Abstract: Over the past decades, constitutions around the world have come to protect a growing 
number of social rights. This constitutionalization of social rights has generally been met with 
approval from academics, human rights activists, policy-makers, and development economists 
alike. But despite this widespread support, there is hardly any evidence on whether the inclusion 
of rights in constitutions actually changes how governments provide social services to their 
citizens. We take up this question by studying the effect of adopting the constitutional right to 
education and healthcare on government spending. Using data on 186 countries’ constitutional 
rights, we employ a variety of empirical tests to examine if the rights to education and healthcare 
are associated with increases in government spending. Our results suggest that the adoption of 
these social rights is not associated with statistically significant or substantively meaningful 
increases in government spending on education or healthcare.  
Key Words: Constitutional Rights; Constitutional Law; Comparative Law; Social Rights; 
Human Rights; Education Spending; Healthcare Spending.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Few topics have attracted as much attention in the comparative law literature as the 
constitutionalization of social rights. Over the past decades, constitutions around the world have 
come to protect a growing number of social rights. As the cold war era ideological divide over 
social rights has waned, social rights have become mainstream constitutional features that are 
found in the West and Global South, autocracies and democracies, and common law and civil 
law systems alike. By 2012, no less than 81 percent of all constitutions included the right to 
education, 71 percent protected access to healthcare, 63 percent protected the right to social 
security, and 39 percent provided a right to housing.  
What is more, these rights are increasingly enforced by courts, who have been formally 
empowered in many countries to scrutinize the political branches’ social spending for 
compliance with their constitution’s social rights protections (Gauri & Brinks 2008; Langford 
2009). In countries as diverse as Germany and Kenya, national courts are reportedly enforcing 
social rights (Langford 2009; Jung et al. 2015). For instance, courts have ordered emergency care 
regardless of ability to pay in South Africa,1 demanded increased government spending on 
education in Indonesia,2 and limited school fees in India3 (Gauri & Brinks 2008 at 8-9). Even in 
the United States, long seen as a bulwark of libertarian values, social rights are enshrined in 
many state constitutions and have been enforced by state courts (Hershkoff 1999; Zackin 2013).  
The constitutionalization of social rights has generally been met with approval from legal 
scholars, human rights activists, philosophers, and development economists (Sunstein 2000 at 
123, 2001 at 221; Landau 2012 at 190). Legal scholars used to debate whether it is appropriate 
for courts to enforce social rights (Sunstein 1997, 2000, 2001; Cross 2001; Sen 2004; Davis 2008 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998(1) SA765 (CC) (South Africa). 
2 Judicial Review of the 2006 Budget Law Case Number: 026/PUU-III/ 2006 (Indonesia). 
3 Ankur Argawal v. Respondent: State of Madhya Pradesh and Others 2000 (India). 
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at 1024), but a new wave of legal scholarship has now widely accepted that courts around the 
world are indeed in the business of social rights enforcement (Sunstein 2001; Langford 2008; 
Ray 2016). Political scientists, in the meantime, have started to use case studies to explore the 
impact of these decisions (Gauri & Brinks 2008; Hoffman & Bentes 2008; Landau 2012). 
Prominent philosophers, such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, have argued that human 
capabilities should part of the definition of economic development (Nussbaum 2011), and that 
social rights are key to promoting human capabilities (Dixon & Nussbaum 2013; Jung et al. 
2015). Development economists, too, have generally looked favorably upon the 
constitutionalization of social rights (World Bank 2006 at 3-4), because investments in human 
capital, through education or healthcare, are generally believed to be conducive to economic 
development (UNDP 1990 at 9). The World Bank has long held that, while its mandate excludes 
a focus on civil and political rights, it does seek to promote social rights (World Bank 2006 at 3-
4). In short, as “the bottom billion” (Collier 2007) of the planet still lacks access to basic 
necessities, the adoption of social rights have been widely regarded as an important way to 
improve access to social services for the poor (World Bank 2006 at 8; Gauri & Brinks 2008; 
Davis 2008 at 687; Young 2012 at 2).4  
But despite this widespread support for including social rights in constitutions, little is 
known on a systematic basis about whether these rights actually change how governments 
provide social services to their citizens. One early paper explored the impact of social rights on 
social spending and government size in a cross-section of 66 countries, and found no correlation 
between social rights and government size and no correlation between education rights and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Social rights have not only become stronger at the national level, but also at the international level. The social 
rights from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have formally been declared 
“indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated” with civil and political rights (Vienna Declaration 1993; Whelan 
2010; Davis 2012 at 1020; Young 2012 at 6). Moreover, with the entry into force of the ICESCR’s first optional 
protocol, social rights are now enforceable by an international body, just like their civil and political counterparts. 	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educational spending (Ben-Bassat & Dahan 2008). To our knowledge, not a single paper has 
since explored the impact of social rights’ on social spending for a global sample of countries.  
This paper takes up that task. More specifically, we explore the impact of the 
constitutionalization of the right to education and the right to healthcare on government spending 
on education and healthcare. Using a variety of empirical techniques, including both matching 
and fixed-effects panel regressions, we find that the adoption of social rights is not associated 
with increases in government spending in these areas. In fact, we do not find any positive effects 
that achieve conventional levels of statistical significance and little evidence of effects that could 
be substantively meaningful. We also conduct additional analyses that explore whether the way 
the constitutional right is formulated changes spending, whether the rights to housing and social 
security are associated with increased spending, and whether the adoption of social rights is 
associated with improved social outcomes (like educational enrollment and life expectancy). 
Although we find a handful of positive results in these additional analyses, the results are largely 
consistent with our primary findings: adopting constitutional social rights does not appear to 
have an effect on government spending.  
These findings make several important contributions. First, and most directly, they 
provide the most comprehensive evidence on the effectiveness of including social rights in 
constitutions till date. While our analysis leaves open the possibility that social rights change 
rhetoric or change the distribution of resources without changing overall spending, it does 
suggest that there is no overall effect on government spending. Although increased government 
spending is of course merely one of the ways in which social rights can have an impact, and 
many questions remain unanswered, our findings are sobering to those invested in improving 
social welfare through constitutionalizing social rights. 
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Second, our results contribute to the growing literature on the effectiveness of 
constitutional rights more generally (Boli-Bennet 1976; Pritchard 1986; Davenport 1996; Cross 
1999; Keith 2002; Keith, Tate, & Poe 2009; Fox & Flores 2009; Keith 2012; Melton 2014). 
Although this literature has produced mixed results, our findings are consistent with recent 
findings suggesting that constitutional rights for individuals are less effective than rights that are 
granted to organizations like unions or political parties (Chilton & Versteeg 2015, 2016).   
Finally, our results also speak to the literature on international human rights. While there 
is a large empirical literature on the effectiveness of human rights treaties (see, e.g., Simmons 
2009; Lupu 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Haftner-Burton 2012), this literature has almost entirely 
ignored the major treaties that provide for social rights. Our findings suggest that, if 
constitutional social rights have not had an effect, it may be reasonable to think that international 
treaties on social rights may similarly have had little impact on government behavior.  	  
2. THEORIES OF SOCIAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
 When social rights are constitutionalized, they are transformed from mere policy goals 
into constitutional obligations. Since constitutions tend to be the highest law of the land, social 
rights that are constitutionalized enjoy priority over competing goals that lack constitutional 
status (Davis 2012 at 1034). It also typically means that governments are legally required to take 
steps to realize these goals, and that failing to do so might amount to a constitutional violation. 
The legal obligations entailed by social rights are usually considered to be three-fold 
(Eide 1987; Shue 1996; Henkin 2009). First, the political branches have to refrain from adopting 
laws and regulations that undermine access to social rights, a requirement commonly described 
as “the obligation to respect” (United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 2009 at 11-12). To illustrate, the government bulldozing down a neighborhood might 
	   7 
constitute a violation of the right to housing.5 Second, the political branches have to take action 
to prevent rights violations from occurring, sometimes known as “the obligation to protect.” For 
example, if private citizens’ actions would deny housing to some, then the government’s failure 
to intervene might entail a violation of the right to housing. Third, the political branches have to 
take steps to gradually expand access to social services, sometimes known as “the obligation to 
fulfill.” 6 For example, they will have to put in place policies to gradually offer more low-cost 
housing to a larger number of people. Under this tri-partite framework, governments generally 
have to take a range of steps to gradually move towards the goal of guaranteeing access to basic 
social services, such as education, healthcare, social security, and housing to all citizens 
(Sunstein 2001 at 235; Scheppele 2004; Young 2012). 
Although this three-part framework is widely accepted, it is of course the case that the 
exact legal obligations entailed by social rights vary across countries and are dependent on the 
phrasing of the constitutional rights and their subsequent judicial interpretations. Yet, regardless 
of the exact form, the literature generally suggests that upholding these three obligations—and 
especially the obligation to fulfill—means that resources get redirected towards social rights 
(Sunstein 2000 at 124; Davis 2012 at 1025). A right to education, for example, is supposed to 
lead to increased government spending on education, which in turn should expand educational 
opportunities or improve educational quality. 
For the fulfillment of constitutional social rights to become a reality, these rights must be 
implemented and enforced. The bulk of the literature has focused on courts as the primary means 
of guaranteeing the constitution’s social rights provisions (Sunstein 2000, 2001; Scheppele 2004; 
Dixon 2007; Gauri & Brinks 2008; Landau 2012). Most prominently, when the South African 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Government of the Republic of S. Africa & Others v. Grootboom & Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).  
6 It is worth noting that some suggest there is a “minimum core” of social rights that must always be guaranteed 
(Young 2008: United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 3, 2003). 
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Constitutional Court ventured into the area of social rights enforcement in the mid-1990s, it 
became the backdrop for a heated debate over whether courts are the appropriate actors to 
enforce social rights (Sajo 1999 at 270; Sunstein 2001; Cross 2001; Dixon 2007; Tushnet 2008). 
The core concern that motivated the debate was that judges might be institutionally ill-equipped 
for the inherently political task of deciding how the political branches should allocate the 
national budget (Goldstone 2010 at vii). 
By now, however, the normative debate has largely subsided and the fact that courts are 
enforcing their constitution’s social rights provisions is widely accepted (Landau 2012). Legal 
scholars are now study the judicial rulings enforcing social rights, their reasoning, and the legal 
obligations they impose (Young 2008; Langford 2009). Political scientists, for their part, have 
started to conduct case studies to discern these rights’ main beneficiaries and redistributive 
consequences (Gauri & Brinks 2008; Hoffman & Bentes 2008; Landau 2012). One insight from 
these studies is that courts often primarily benefit those who have the financial means to access 
courts. For example, Landau (2012) shows, in the Colombian context, that judicial enforcement 
of social rights tends to direct resources towards higher income groups that can afford to go to 
court, while failing to improve the lives of the poorest citizens. Another study on Brazil notes 
that most judicial decisions enforcing social welfare rights involve the direct provision of goods 
towards the litigants who can afford the court system, instead of broad distributional change for 
the poorest for the poor (Hoffman & Bentes 2008 at 117). These decisions therefore tend to 
address middle class concerns, such as the infamous court decision that ordered a penile 
reconstruction at the expense of the state (Hoffman & Bentes 2008). Yet, there are also reports of 
courts providing collective remedies that benefit litigants and non-litigants alike (Gauri & Brinks 
2008 at 27). Regardless of the types of remedies and the primary beneficiaries, however, the 
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literature overwhelmingly suggests that courts frequently force governments to direct resources 
towards social rights.  
Of course, direct judicial enforcement is not the only way in which constitutional social 
rights might matter. First, even when not directly enforced, social rights can inform 
interpretations in other areas of law. For example, Emily Zackin (2013) shows how in U.S. 
states, constitution-makers constitutionalized social rights to pre-empt Lochner-like 
interpretations of the right to property. That is, the fact that the constitution includes social rights 
made it harder for courts to invalidate social welfare policies for violating the right to property.  
Second, social rights can matter through the electoral process. Where social rights are 
enshrined in the constitution, they can serve as a focal point for groups that mobilize for the 
protection of social rights. When social policy goals are transformed into constitutional rights, 
this empowers individuals. Different groups can invoke the constitution to remind the 
government of its social rights promises, and try to hold it accountable in the next election 
(Zackin 2013; Versteeg & Zackin 2014). Indeed, this idea is consistent with the existing 
literature on human rights treaty effectiveness, which has found that for rights to become a 
reality, there need to be constituencies invested in the enforcement of the right. It is these groups, 
and their litigation, lobbying and staging of protests, that turn rights into a reality (Simmons 
2009). Constitutional rights likewise give these groups a promise to point to when a government 
fails to provide basic necessities to its people, and help them to coordinate and mobilize against 
the government (Weingast 1997; Epp 1998; Chilton & Versteeg 2015).  
  Regardless of the exact mechanism through which these rights matter—direct judicial 
enforcement, indirect judicial enforcement, or enforcement through the electoral process—the 
constitutionalization of social rights is supposed to elevate the importance of social rights vis-à-
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vis other policy goals and to direct public resources towards their fulfillment. Thus, each of those 
mechanisms might bring about an increase in public spending on social rights relative to the 
policy goals that do not enjoy constitutional status. 
Importantly, each of these enforcement mechanisms also has its limitations. Even where 
courts are rendering high-profile decisions that direct governments to allocate resources towards 
education and healthcare, there is no guarantee that these decisions are actually enforced. As 
Alexander Hamilton famously remarked, courts lack the power of the sword and the purse 
(Federalist 78). Especially where the judicial decisions are directed at the executive, the 
executive may simply refrain from implementing them. This is the case even in democracies that 
generally respect the rule of law. Gerald Rosenberg’s (1991) well-known study shows that many 
high-profile decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court had limited impact or were simply ignored. 
And when courts persistently stand in the executive’s way, they might be stripped of their 
powers, as recent events in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Turkey show (Gardbaum 2015).  
Social mobilization, likewise, cannot be taken for granted. Even though people protesting 
and demanding their rights is potentially one of the most powerful tools to remind the political 
branches of the constitution’s promises, such mobilization is fraught with collective action 
problems. To mobilize for the protection of rights, disconnected citizens have to coordinate their 
actions and incur the costs associated with doing so (Olson 1965; McCarthy & Zald 1973). As 
the literature on social mobilization has suggested, overcoming such collective action problems 
requires the presence of entrepreneurial individuals motivated by career benefits or the presence 
of actual grievances (Hardin 1982). Chilton & Versteeg (2016) theorize that such collective 
action problems are easier overcome for some rights than others. Specifically, they suggests that 
for rights practiced in organizations, such as the right to unionize or the right to form political 
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parties, a forum exists through which disaffected individuals can coordinate their actions and 
have tools at their disposal to resist rights encroachment. Chilton & Versteeg (2016) find 
empirical support for this theory: constitutional protection of the right to form political parties 
and the right to unionize leads to increased protection of these rights, while individual rights, 
such as the freedom of expression or the freedom of movement, appear to not make a difference.  
Social rights are also individual rights. They are individual entitlements that are not 
typically enjoyed in groups. The right to education, for example, entitles individuals to have 
access to schooling (in some cases, free of charge). The right to healthcare likewise grants 
individuals a right to access basic types of healthcare. Indeed, one important finding in the 
literature on social rights enforcement is that it is mainly middle class individuals with access to 
courts that seek to enforce these rights, while broader public interest litigation that benefits the 
poor is often lacking (Gauri & Brinks 2008; Landau 2012). The existing literature thus hints at a 
collective action problem in mobilizing for social rights in a way that benefits the poor.7  
Considering these inherent limitations to social rights enforcement, it is not clear, on 
theoretical grounds, what impact the constitutionalization of social rights may have. The near-
universal consensus that these rights are normatively desirable is no guarantee that they actually 
shift government behavior in some way. The remainder of this paper empirically tests whether 
these social rights translates into increased social spending.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  While schools and hospitals are organizations that are potentially able to organize to protect the right to education 
and healthcare, it is not clear that they always benefit from broadening access. Providing services to those without 
the ability to pay may end up being costly. What is more, to the extent schools and hospitals are funded by the 
government, they may not want to protest the government. For that reason, it is not clear that social rights are 
accompanied by organizations with strong incentives to protect these rights for everyone. Social rights, we believe, 
are therefore more like individual rights than organizational rights.	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3. DATA 
3.1. Constitutional Rights Data 
To analyze the effect of constitutional rights on de facto respect for rights in practice, we 
rely on original data on constitutional rights based on the hand-coding of all the written 
constitutions from 186 countries in place from 1946-2012.8 For each constitution, we have data 
on whether it includes a range of constitutional rights. The dataset was first introduced and 
explained in [omitted for review]. From this dataset, we selected two social rights to focus on: 
(1) the right to education and (2) the right to healthcare.9 Although there are several reasons to 
focus on these rights, we primarily did so because corresponding measures of government 
spending on these issues are available. In our robustness analysis, we further explore the impact 
of (3) the right to social security, and (4) the right to housing, albeit for a smaller group of 
countries, because the relevant spending data for these rights has more limited availability.  
Figure 1 presents the prevalence of those rights in the world’s constitutions over time. As 
Figure 1 shows, 81% of countries had a right to education and 71% of countries had a right to 
healthcare in their constitution by 2012. Figure 2 depicts the countries that had these rights in 
their constitutions as of 2012 and reveals that the overwhelming majority of constitutions include 
at least one of the two rights. By 2012, of the 186 countries in our dataset, 21 had a constitutional 
right to education, 2 had a constitutional right to healthcare, and 130 had both a right to 
education and a right to healthcare in their constitution.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Part 1 of the Supplementary Materials provides more information on our constitutional rights data.  
9 Part 2 of the Supplementary Materials provides more information on social rights studied in this paper.  
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Figure 1: Countries with a Constitutional Right to Education & Healthcare Over Time 
 
 
Figure 2: Countries with a Constitutional Right to Education & Healthcare in 2012 
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3.2. Social Spending Data 
To test the impact of social rights, we use measures from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) that capture relevant public spending.10 Following the practice in the literature 
(Avelino, Brown, & Hunter 2005; Stasavage 2005; Doyle 2015), our measure of education 
spending is the annual public education expenditure as a percentage of a country’s GDP. This 
data is available from 1970 to 2012 for up to 178 countries. Our measure of healthcare spending 
is the annual public healthcare expenditure as a percentage of a country’s GDP. This data is 
available from 1995 to 2012 for up to 182 countries. In further analyses, we also test the impact 
of social rights using two additional sources: (1) data from the Global Development Network 
Growth Database on the percentage of the GDP spent on housing and social security; and (2) 
data from the WDI on health and education outcomes.  
Our choice to use social spending by the government as our primary dependent variables 
requires some explanation. Most importantly, social spending does not guarantee that social 
rights will actually be fulfilled. A government may increase its spending on education, and yet, at 
least for the time being, many may remain illiterate. Our measures thus capture government 
efforts to make progress on realizing a right, rather than social outcomes.  
To gauge how spending measures contrast with other possible indicators, it is useful to 
consult the classification of human rights indicators provided by the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights (2008) (“OHCHR”). The OHCHR’s 2008 report on human 
rights indicators distinguishes between “structural indicators,” “process indicators,” and 
“outcome indicators.” Structural indicators capture “basic institutional mechanisms deemed 
necessary for facilitating realization of a human right,” such as whether domestic constitutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We specifically use the October 2015 edition of the WDI. For education expenditure we use the variable 
“SE.XPD.TOTLGD.ZS” that captures public education spending as a percentage of GDP. For health expenditure we 
use the variable “SH.XPD.PUBL.ZS” that captures public healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP.  
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law protects a right (OHCR 2008 at 11). Process indicators, by contrast, capture government 
action towards the final fulfillment of a right (OHCR 2008 at 11). Social spending measures are 
an example of process indicators. Finally, outcome indicators capture the final realization of a 
right, such as life expectancy or literacy rates (OHCR 2008 at 12).  
We believe that, when it comes to measuring the impact of social rights obligations, 
process indicators are more suitable than outcome indicators. In this respect, social rights may be 
different from civil and political rights, which are usually evaluated using outcome indicators. 
This is because civil and political rights are negative rights: large steps towards their fulfillment 
can be made by simply not violating them. Indeed, an important step towards fulfilling the 
prohibition of torture is a government refraining from torture.11 The fulfillment of social rights, 
by contrast, is a long-term process that is affected by many factors beyond a government’s 
control. This reality is acknowledged in the ICESCR, which demands that each party 
“undertakes to take steps,” “to the maximum of its available resources . . . . with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights” (art 2.1). In other words, measures of 
government spending are more likely to pick up constitutionally induced changes in government 
behavior than slow-moving outcome variables. Considering the nature of social rights, we thus 
believe that it is more appropriate to use measures that capture government efforts rather than 
ultimate outcomes. That said, despite this belief, as part of the additional analyses in Part 6, we 
also report results using education and healthcare outcomes as our dependent variable.   	  
3.3. Graphical Exploration  
Before turning to our primary empirical analysis, an initial exploration of the relationship 
between social rights and social spending suggests that social rights might not be associated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Of course, this binary distinction is problematic as “negative” rights like the prohibition of torture also require 
government action (Posner 2014). 
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increases in social spending. Figure 3 depicts the data on government spending on education and 
healthcare over time. The bold lines present the average spending for all countries in the sample, 
the dotted lines present the average spending for countries without a constitutional right, and the 
dashed line present the same for countries with the right to education and healthcare, 
respectively. As Figure 3 shows, countries have constitutionalized education or healthcare spend 
a lower percentage of their GDP on education and healthcare than countries without these rights.  
	  
Figure 3: Government Social Spending as Percent of GDP Over Time 
 
Of course, even though countries with constitutional rights to education and healthcare 
spend less on education and healthcare overall than countries without these rights, it could still 
be the case that individual countries increase their spending after constitutionalizing these rights. 
To examine this, Figure 4 depicts a subset of countries that added the right to education or 
healthcare to their constitution for the period for which we have social spending data. It depicts 
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the average score for the five years before and after the constitutional right was adopted. Figure 4 
provides little evidence that the constitutional right to education or healthcare shift government 
spending. There is a slight decrease in public spending on education and a slightly increase in 
public spending on healthcare, but both of these trends appear to pre-date the adoption of the 
constitutional right. Although Figure 4 does not take account of confounding factors, the raw 
data provides little evidence that social rights impact social spending.  	  
Figure 4: Government Spending Before & After Adoption of Constitutional Social Right 
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problem faced by the literature on human rights treaty effectiveness. Over the past decades, 
scholars in this field have used a variety of methods to address this problem, including Heckman 
selection models (Neumayer 2005) and instrumental variable regressions (Simmons 2009).  
The most common technique that has been used, however, is “matching” (Simmons & 
Hopkins 2005; Hill 2010; Lupu 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Nielsen & Simmons 2014; Furhmann & 
Lupu 2016). The goal of matching is to reduce significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups by pairing observations that are as similar in as many relevant ways as possible, 
except that one has received the treatment while the other has not. If the observations are similar 
along all relevant dimensions except that one has received the treatment, then observed 
differences in the dependent variable can be attributed to the treatment.  
An important shortcoming of matching is that it relies on conditioning exclusively on 
observable variables. It is possible, therefore, that there are unobserved variables influencing 
both the treatment and outcome. When these are not included in the matching, the impact of the 
un-observables might be mistakenly attributed to the treatment. In the human rights context, a 
major concern has been that there are unobserved differences in states’ preferences for treaty 
commitments that are related to human rights practices. To address this problem, Yonatan Lupu 
(2013a, 2013b, 2015) developed a method to measure a state’s preferences for treaty 
commitment. The method is to estimate the treaty “ideal point” for countries based on their 
existing treaty ratification record, and then calculate the probability that a state would have 
ratified a particular agreement. To do so, Lupu uses the W-NOMINATE algorithm that was 
developed to explain the ideological preferences of legislators (Poole & Rosenthal 1997).  
Under this approach, the decision to ratify a human rights treaty is modeled as specific 
points in n-dimensional policy space (Lupu 2013a, 2013b, 2015). The ideal points of every state 
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in every year are then calculated as specific points in the same n-dimensional policy space based 
on previous ratification decisions. The assumption is that the closer a state’s ideal point is to the 
point estimated for a particular treaty, the more likely it is that a state will ratify that treaty. After 
calculating the probabilities of treaty ratification in this way, Lupu includes them in matching 
algorithms, thus accounting for an important unobservable determinant of treaty ratification.  
In recent work, Chilton & Versteeg (2015, 2016) use the same approach to estimate the 
effect of constitutional rights on government behavior. Specifically, they use ideal point 
estimation to approximate every country’s constitutional “ideal point”, and use this to calculate 
the probability that a country would adopt a specific right. They subsequently match on these 
probabilities and a set of standard observable variables. In this paper, we follow their approach. 
	  
4.2. Implementation 
Following Lupu (2013a, 2013b, 2015) and Chilton & Versteeg (2015, 2016) our analysis 
involves three stages: (1) ideal point estimation; (2) matching; and (3) regression analysis.  
4.2.1. Ideal point Estimation 
In the first stage, we estimate every country’s constitutional ideal point. Following 
Chilton & Versteeg (2015, 2016), we do so based on 87 rights that are commonly found in 
national constitutions. Specifically, we estimate a two dimensional model using the W-
NOMINATE algorithm for the R programming language (Poole et al. 2011). This analysis yields 
annual constitutional ideal points along two dimensions for 186 countries from 1946 to 2012.  
With these ideal points, we next estimate the probability that a country would have 
included the right to education or healthcare in its constitution by calculating the distance 
between the country’s ideal point and the ideal point of that specific right. Doing so produces an 
estimate of the probability between 0 and 1 that a country would have a specific right protected 
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by its constitution in every year. Intuitively, these estimates capture the probability that a country 
will adopt a right based on its general preference for rights commitment as revealed by its other 
constitutional choices.  
4.2.2. Matching 
In the second stage, we match country-year observations where the country’s constitution 
had the relevant constitutional right to country-year observations where the country did not have 
the relevant right. Our matching procedure uses both the probabilities calculated in the first stage 
of our analysis and a number of observable variables that are commonly used in the literature on 
social spending (Avelino, Brown, & Hunter 2005 at 631-32; Doyle 2015 at 795-96).12  
First, we control for the Urban Population (as a percentage of the total population). We 
do so because urbanization tends to be associated with industrialization and organized workers, 
which, in turn, might leads to stronger demands for social spending (Bates 1981). Second, we 
control for the Population Over 65 (as percentage of total population), since a higher number of 
elderly often leads to more social spending. Third, we control for Economic Growth, as captured 
by the annual percentage growth in GDP per capita, because economic volatility can affect social 
spending. Fourth, we control for Inflation, since high inflation suggests that the government may 
be spending more than it receives. All these variables are taken from the WDI.13 Fifth, we 
control for GDP per capita, taken from the Penn World Tables, since wealthier countries spend 
more on social welfare (a principle known as “Wagner’s law”).  
In addition, we include several standard control variables from the literature on 
government repression (Poe & Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith 1999). Specifically, since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Part 3 of the Supplementary Materials provides summary statistics for all of the variables used in our analysis.  
13 We use the October 2015 edition of the World Development Indicators. To capture Urban Population, we used 
variable “SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS”; to capture Population Ages 65 and above (% of total) we used 
“SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS”; to capture total Unemployment, we used “SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS”; to capture Inflation, we 
used “NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG”; to capture GDP per capita growth (annual %), we used “NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG”. 
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democratic countries are generally more respectful of human rights and engage in higher rates of 
social spending (Avelino, Brown, & Hunter 2005), we also match on each country’s Polity Score 
as a measure of democracy.14 Moreover, we match on whether a country is engaged in an 
Interstate War or Civil War (from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program15), as wars tend to affect a 
country’s rights performance, which might include social rights. Given the evidence that simply 
deleting observations with missing variables biases results (Lall 2016), we follow the practice in 
the human rights literature of using Amelia to input missing values for our control variables 
(Lupu 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Chilton & Versteeg 215, 2016). Additionally, following Lupu (2016) 
we include a lagged dependent variable and a linear time trend in our matching process. 	  
Table 1: Matching Results 
 Education  Healthcare 
 
Full 
Sample 
Matched 
Sample 
 Full 
Sample 
Matched 
Sample 
Sample Size 2,356 540  3,045 886 
Treatment Units 1,792 270  2,095 443 
Control Units 564 270  950 443 
Mean Distance – Treatment Group 0.893 0.688  0.850 0.608 
Mean Distance – Control Group 0.341 0.573  0.331 0.520 
Improvement in Balance 79%  83% 	  
We selected to use propensity score matching (Honaker, King, & Blackwell 2011).16 
While there are other matching methods available, this method is both advocated by Lupu 
(2013a) and has been the primary method used in the international law literature (Simmons & 
Hopkins 2005; Hill 2010). Using this approach, we created two different matched datasets—one 
for the right to education and one of the right to healthcare. As Table 1 shows, doing so 
dramatically improves the balance for each of our two matched samples: the balance for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This is the “polity2” variable from the Polity IV Project.  
15 Yearly Conflict Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: www.ucdp.uu.se/database. 
16 Following Chilton & Versteeg (2015), we use nearest neighbor matching with a caliper of 0.5 to ensure that the 
matched pairs improve the balance within the sample.  
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education sample improved by 79% and the balance for healthcare sample improved by 83%.17  
4.2.3. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In the third stage, we use our two matched datasets to test the impact of social rights on 
social spending using regression analysis. We do so because the treatment and control group are 
not perfectly balanced after the matching process. Specifically, we estimate an OLS model that 
includes all the variables that we matched on, as well as a set of year fixed-effects (see Lupu 
2013a, 2013b, 2015; Chilton & Versteeg 2015; Furhmann & Lupu 2016). We address potential 
serial correlation by calculating robust standard errors clustered at the country level.  	  
5. PRIMAY RESULTS 
5.1. Baseline Specification 
 
Our baseline results are presented in Table 2. Column (1) presents our baseline estimate 
of the effect of having a constitutional right to education on public spending on education as a 
percent of GDP, and column (2) presents our baseline estimate of the effect of having a 
constitutional right to health on public spending on healthcare as a percent of GDP. The results 
in Table 2 suggest that the effects of both rights are positive, but statistically insignificant and 
substantively small. In other words, they suggest that constitutionalizing these social rights does 
not produce a statistically significant increase the amount of money that the government spends 
on these rights. In additional analysis reported in Part 5 of the Supplemental Materials, we find 
the same results when use spending data that capture public spending on education and 
healthcare as a percentage of total social spending.18 Taken together, these results are consistent 
with the graphical evidence presented in Part 3 of this paper.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Part 4 of the Supplementary Materials provides more information on the samples our matching process produced.  
18 We use public spending as a percent of GDP as our primary dependent variable, but we use the percent of total 
social spending as a robustness check is consistent with the practice of other research on social spending (Avelino, 
Brown, & Hunter 2005; Doyle 2015). 
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Table 2: Effect of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending – Baseline Specifications 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Healthcare 
      
Right 0.031 0.023 
 
(0.056) (0.030) 
Probability of Right -0.045 -0.066* 
 
(0.056) (0.037) 
Urban Population -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.007 0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.005) 
Inflation 0.000 -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.073 -0.017 
 
(0.051) (0.020) 
GDP Growth -0.012** -0.010*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
Polity Score 0.012** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Interstate War 0.320** -0.049 
 (0.149) (0.057) 
Civil War -0.367* -0.115 
 (0.210) (0.071) 
Spendingt-1 0.934*** 0.986*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) 
Year -0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
   Observations 540 886 
R-squared 0.930 0.962 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
5.2. Alternative Specifications 
Our primary results are not dependent on the specifics of our empirical strategy. Instead, 
we find the same results even when not using each of the key elements of our empirical 
approach. To demonstrate this, Table 3 reports regressions that remove one element of our 
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empirical strategy at a time until we are left with panel regressions with only fixed effects.19  
Table 3: Effect of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending – Alternative Specifications 
  
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Healthcare 
      
A. Baseline Specification 0.031 0.023 
 
(0.056) (0.030) 
  Observations 540 886 
R-squared 0.930 0.962 
   
B. Without Matching 0.028 0.025 
 (0.037) (0.025) 
   
Observations 2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960 
   
C. Without Nominate -0.000 -0.021 
 (0.031) (0.016) 
   
Observations 2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960 
   
D. Without Amelia -0.015 -0.027 
 (0.032) (0.018) 
   
Observations 2,104 2,264 
 R-squared 0.913 0.963 
   
E. Without Controls -0.076 0.162 
 (0.280) (0.115) 
   
Observations 3,042 3,227 
R-squared 0.762 0.958 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
As a baseline, Panel A reproduces the primary specification presented in Table 2. Panel B 
then reports regressions that include all the same variables as our baseline specifications, but the 
data was not first pre-processed with matching. Panel C reports regressions that also do not pre-
process the data with matching and additionally do not include our estimate of the probability 
that a country includes the right in its constitution as obtained through the W-Nominate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The results reported in Tables 3 – 6 only report the coefficients for the relevant constitutional right variable and 
omit the coefficients for the control variables. Part 6 of the Supplementary Materials reports the complete regression 
results for all of the regressions reported in the body of the paper.  
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procedure. Panel D reports regressions that are not pre-processed with matching, do not include 
our estimated probability that a country would adopt a constitutional right, and also does not use 
Amelia to input missing values for our control variables. Finally, Panel E goes a step further and 
reports regressions that do not using matching, the W-Nominate probabilities, the Amelia 
imputation procedure, or any control variables. Instead it merely includes year fixed-effects, 
country fixed-effects, and country specific time trends. In not a single one of the five Panels are 
there any results that are positive and statistically significant. Taken together, the results in Table 
3 suggest that including these social rights in a constitution is not associated with a statistically 
significant increase in relevant spending.  
 
5.3. Substantive Effects 	  
While the results reported thus far suggest that constitutionalizing social rights is not 
associated with statistically significant increases in social spending, we have not yet considered 
the size of the effect. Specifically, it is possible that a constitutional right has a substantively 
large effect that is not statistically significant because the model is imprecisely estimated.  
To address this concern, Rainey (2014) developed an approach to evaluate whether null 
results are actually the same as evidence that a given variable has no effect. The approach 
requires first defining the smallest effect that could be considered substantively meaningful 
(denoted as m), and then defining a reject region from –m to m. A variable is then considered to 
have no effect when the 90% confidence interval for a coefficient does not cross –m or m. This 
approach is easy to implement in a standard regression framework and has also already been 
used in the human rights literature (Nielsen & Simmons 2014; Chilton & Versteeg 2015).  
This approach does, however, require researchers to subjectively define the size of m. 
When studying the relationship between democratization on social spending, Avelino, Brown, & 
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Hunter (2005) argue that a 0.5 percentage point increase in social spending as a percent of GDP 
is a substantively meaningful effect. Although it is admittedly subjective, we thus decided to 
define m as 0.5. In other words, we decided that a 0.5 percentage point change in government 
spending would be large enough to be considered substantively meaningful.  
Figure 5: Substantive Effects (estimated coefficients and 90% confidence intervals) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the point estimate and the 90 confidence intervals for the models 
presented in Tables 3 that estimate the effect of the right to education and healthcare on 
government spending. As the left side panel of Figure 5 shows, the confidence intervals for the 
right to education does not cross 0.5 for any of the regressions. It does, however, cross -0.5 in 
Model E—which is the model that does not include any control variables, and is thus likely 
imprecisely estimated. As the right panel of Figure 5 shows, the confidence intervals for the right 
to Healthcare also does not cross 0.5 for any of the regressions. The results in Figure 5 thus 
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reveal not only that the effect of the constitutional right to education and healthcare is not 
statistically significant, but also that there is no evidence that the results might nonetheless be 
substantively meaningful.    
6. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 
 
Our primary results suggested that constitutional rights to education or healthcare is not 
associated with higher government spending on education or healthcare. To further explore the 
impact of constitutionalizing social rights, we next examine the impact of alternative 
formulations of the rights that countries used in their constitutions, the effect of other social 
rights, and the effect of the right to education and healthcare on social outcomes.  
	  
6.1. Testing the Effect of Alternative Formulations of Constitutional Social Rights 
 
Not all constitutional education and healthcare rights are the same. Indeed, there are 
important variance in the way that countries formulate these rights. We therefore coded three 
different ways these rights are provided in constitutions and explore whether these affect the 
impact of these rights on social spending. First, we coded whether they were drafted as rights for 
citizens (e.g., “everyone has a right to an education”) or whether they were drafted as goal for the 
government (e.g., “the government shall ensure that everyone has access to education”). While 
the difference may be mere semantics, it is possible that granting explicit rights is more 
empowering for individuals that seek to enforce their rights. We thus coded a version of our key 
independent variable for the right to education and healthcare that excludes countries that merely 
phrased these rights as a government goal. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 we recreate all the 
model specifications presented in Table 3 while using this alternative constitutional rights 
coding. Although the regression in Panel A does find a small statistically significant effect for 
the right to education, this result is not robust to our alternative model specifications. The rest of 
the results are consistent with our baseline results, suggesting no impact. 
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Table 4: Effect of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending – Alternative Formulations 
 
Excluding 
Policy Goals 
 Excluding  
Non-Judiciable Rights 
 Including Guarantees of 
Free Services 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Healthcare 
(3) 
Education 
(4) 
Healthcare 
(5) 
Education 
(6) 
Healthcare 
                
A. Baseline Specification 0.060* 0.003  0.054* 0.006  0.018 -0.023 
 
(0.033) (0.022)  (0.032) (0.023)  (0.036) (0.022) 
 
      
  Observations 1,204 1,418  1,010 1,148  1,050 1,184 
R-squared 0.916 0.960  0.921 0.973  0.921 0.950 
         
B. Without Matching 0.035 -0.007  0.029 -0.009  0.013 -0.028** 
 (0.026) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.020)  (0.027) (0.014) 
         
Observations 2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960 
         
C. Without Nominate 0.025 -0.022  0.018 -0.028*  0.004 -0.024 
 (0.026) (0.015)  (0.023) (0.015)  (0.025) (0.015) 
   
 
  
 
  
Observations 2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960 
         
D. Without Amelia 0.010 -0.037**  -0.003 -0.043**  -0.005 -0.038*** 
 (0.024) (0.015)  (0.024) (0.017)  (0.023) (0.015) 
         
Observations 2,104 2,264  2,104 2,264  2,104 2,264 
R-squared 0.913 0.963  0.913 0.963  0.913 0.963 
         
E. Without Controls 0.053 0.148  -0.300 0.055  0.043 0.001 
 (0.225) (0.096)  (0.292) (0.128)  (0.267) (0.178) 
         
Observations 3,042 3,227  3,042 3,227  3,042 3,227 
R-squared 0.762 0.958  0.763 0.958  0.762 0.958 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
Second, we coded whether the social rights provisions in the constitution were explicitly 
made non-justiciable. While uncommon, some countries grant social rights a different 
constitutional status than other rights.20 We thus re-coded our primary variables so that countries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 One example is the constitution of India, which states that “[t]he provisions contained in this Part shall not be 
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws” (Constitution of India, art. 37). 
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that explicitly ban the judicial enforcement education or healthcare rights are considered not to 
protect these rights. The estimates using this alternative coding are presented in columns (3) and 
(4) of Table 4. Although the results in Panel A again provide some evidence that including a 
non-judiciable right to Education may be associated with statistically significant higher spending, 
the result is not robust to alternative model specifications and is substantively small.    
Third, we coded whether the constitution requires education and healthcare to be 
provided free of charge. As it turns out, 63 percent of the countries that provide a right to 
education specifically stipulate that education should be available free of charge, while 23 
percent of the countries that provide a right to healthcare do the same. If anything, we may 
expect that when the constitution requires health and education to be provided free of charge, the 
impact on government spending will be larger. We thus recoded our key rights variables so that 
only countries with constitutions that guarantee the right to Education or Health are available 
free are coded as having the right. The results using this alternative coding are presented in 
columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. Like with our baseline specifications, these estimates do not 
provide evidence that the constitutional right is associated with increased government spending. 
 
6.2. Testing the Effect of Other Social Rights 
Our analyses thus far have relied on social spending data from the WDI. An alternative 
data source that has been used to study social spending is the Global Development Network 
Growth Database. Although this data has less coverage than the WDI, it includes data on 
government spending on housing and social security as a percent of GDP. 21 This allows us to 
include two additional constitutional rights: the right to housing and the right to social security.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This data is available at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,content 
MDK:20701055~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. The variables we use are 82.E 
“Social Security and Welfare” and 82.F “Housing & Community Amenities.” 
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Table 5: Effect of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending – Housing and Social Security 
  
(1) 
Housing 
(2) 
Social Security 
      
A. Baseline Specification 0.002 0.051 
 
(0.029) (0.058) 
  Observations 598 610 
R-squared 0.741 0.986 
   
B. Without Matching -0.003 -0.041 
 (0.025) (0.060) 
   
Observations 1,560 1,548 
R-squared 0.757 0.982 
   
C. Without Nominate -0.038 -0.008 
 (0.024) (0.045) 
   
Observations 1,560 1,548 
R-squared 0.757 0.982 
   
D. Without Amelia -0.027 -0.009 
 (0.021) (0.050) 
   
Education 1,339 1,322 
  0.772 0.983 
   
E. Without Controls 0.197 0.525 
 (0.213) (0.433) 
   
Observations 1,716 1,695 
R-squared 0.706 0.970 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 	  
In Table 5 we test the effectiveness of these rights using the same specifications 
introduced in Table 3. The results reported in Table 5 do not provide any evidence that countries 
that have included the right to Housing or Social Security have higher spending on housing or 
social security. Instead, the results are substantively small and not statistically significant.  
6.3. The Effect of Social Rights on Education and Health Outcomes 
We have thus far focused on testing whether including social rights in constitutions 
increased government spending on the relevant social services. It is theoretically possible, 
	   31 
however, that countries could improve the provision of a given social service—for example, by 
improving efficiency—without increasing government spending.  
Table 6: Effect of Constitutional Social Rights on Education and Health Outcomes 
 Educational Outcomes  Health Outcomes 
  
(1) 
Education  
Intake 
(2) 
Education 
Persistence 
(3) 
Youth 
Literacy 
 (4) 
Total 
Physicians 
(5) 
Hospital 
Beds 
(6) 
Life 
Expectancy 
               
A. Baseline Specification 0.052 -0.404 ---  -0.006 0.104 0.004 
 
(0.520) (0.592) ---  (0.020) (0.099) (0.040) 
 
     
  Observations 630 332 ---  290 232 2,404 
R-squared 0.936 0.962 ---  0.984 0.986 0.999 
        
B. Without Matching 0.127 0.109 0.327  -0.010 0.060 0.001 
 (0.315) (0.308) (0.529)  (0.010) (0.068) (0.036) 
        
Observations 3,429 2,111 95  1,683 1,405 7,778 
R-squared 0.907 0.955 0.993  0.982 0.989 0.999 
        
C. Without Nominate 0.302 0.061 0.388  0.001 0.050 0.069*** 
 (0.273) (0.259) (0.237)  (0.008) (0.031) (0.024) 
    
 
   
Observations 3,429 2,111 95  1,683 1,405 7,778 
R-squared 0.907 0.955 0.993  0.982 0.989 0.999 
        
D. Without Amelia 0.229 0.042 0.435  0.004 0.071* 0.078*** 	   (0.297) (0.268) (0.314)  (0.009) (0.036) (0.025) 	          
Observations 2,691 1,820 80  1,474 1,220 5,702 
R-squared 0.913 0.957 0.993  0.981 0.989 0.999 
        
E. Without Controls 2.318 2.200 4.825  -0.087* -0.179 0.496 
 (4.239) (2.188) (3.517)  (0.045) (0.158) (0.548) 
        
Observations 4,042 2,749 568  3,096 2,505 7,980 
R-squared 0.834 0.945 0.991  0.948 0.960 0.979 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To test this possibility, we also collected data from the World Development Indicators on 
Educational and Healthcare outcomes. We collected information on three educational outcomes:  
(1) Education Intake, that is, the gross intake ratio in first grade of primary education, as a % of 
	   32 
the relevant age group, (2) Education Persistence, that is, persistence to last grade of primary 
education, as a % of the cohort, and (3) Youth Literacy, that is, the % of people ages 15-24 that 
are literate. (Note: the Youth Literacy data has extremely limited coverage, and, as a result, we do 
not think much weight should be put on those results). We also collected data on three health 
outcomes: (4) the number of Physicians per 1000 people, (5) the number of Hospital Beds per 
1000 people, and (6) the Life Expectancy rate.  
In Table 6 we report the results from the same specifications as reported in Table 3, but 
using these outcome measures as our dependent variables. For the regressions testing the effect 
of the right to education—which are reported in columns (1) to (3)—we do not find any positive 
and statistically significant effects. For the regressions testing the right to healthcare, we do find 
evidence of a positive effect on Hospital Beds in Panel D and Life Expectancy in Panel C and D. 
Obviously, if the constitutional right to healthcare did improve outcomes in these ways, it would 
be incredibly important. Since there has been a general linear increase in life expectancy over 
time and these findings are not robust to alternative specifications, however, we are hesitant too 
make much of the results. We do think that they suggest the need for future research to build on 
our project and investigate the effect on health outcomes in more depth.   
	  
7. CONCLUSION 
While social rights have generally been met with great enthusiasm in both academic and 
policy circles, we find that they do not appear to shift government behavior. More specifically, 
we find that the adoption of the right to education or the right to healthcare is not associated with 
increased public spending on education or healthcare. We also do not find positive results when 
testing alternative ways countries formulate their rights, other social rights, and when using 
social outcomes data instead of social spending data as our dependent variable.  
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It is possible, of course, that constitutional social rights may still have important effects. 
For example, although our evidence suggests constitutional social rights do not have an effect in 
general, it may be the case that they do have an effect in certain conditions—like in countries 
with independent judiciaries or particularly strong social movements. Additionally, the 
constitutionalization of social rights may influence outcomes in other ways. For instance, it 
might change the way politicians talk about social justice, or the way that judges decide cases in 
other realms. Moreover, adopting social rights may have distributive consequences not captured 
by overall social spending data. Future research should explore these possibilities.  
Although future research might reveal other benefits of social rights not captured by our 
analysis, our findings show that placing these rights into a constitution do not lead to increased 
government spending towards the fulfillment of those rights. This is an important insight for 
those dedicated to increasing access to healthcare and education, as it suggests that they might 
want to focus their efforts on areas other than the constitution.	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Rights without Resources:  
The Impact of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending 
 
Supplementary Materials 
These materials provide information that supplements the analysis and results presented in the 
body of our paper. The supplementary materials are broken down into six parts. Those parts 
present: (1) information on the 87 constitutioanl rights used for our ideal point analysis and a 
graph that shows their trajectory over time; (2) additional information on the four social rights 
that feature in our analysis; (3) summary statistics for the dependent, treatment, and control 
variables used in our primary analysis; (4) additional information on the matched samples used 
in our primary analysis; (5) robustness checks using the percent of government spending on 
education and healthcare (as opposed to public spending on education and healthcare as a percent 
of GDP) as the dependent variables; and (6) complete regression results for all the tables 
presented in the body of the paper.  
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1. Constitutional Rights Data 
This part provides information on our data on countries constitutional rights. This information is 
divided into two parts: (A) a table listing the 87 constitutional rights that we used to conduct our 
ideal point estimation; and (B) a figure depicting the average number of these 87 rights in the 
world’s constitutions for the period 1946-2012.  
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A. Rights Used in Ideal Point Estimation 
 
87 Rights Used in Ideal Point Estimation 
Right to freedom of religion 
Freedom of press and/or expression 
Right to assembly and/ or association 
Right to strike and/ or unionize 
Right to vote 
Freedom to form political parties 
Right to a remedy when rights are violated 
Right to petition 
Right to information about government 
Right to compensation  
Right to resist when rights are violated 
Right to “petition for amparo” 
Right to establish private schools 
Freedom of education 
Right to privacy of family life 
Right to protection of one’s reputation or honor 
Prohibition of death penalty 
Right to privacy of personal data 
Free development of personality 
Protection of rights for unborn children 
Right to bear arms 
Prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention 
Right to privacy of the home 
Right to privacy of communication 
Freedom of movement 
Prohibition of torture 
Right to life 
Right not to be expelled from home territory 
Prohibition of slavery 
Right to personal privacy 
Artistic freedom 
Right of access to court (habeas corpus) 
Prohibition of ex post facto laws  
Presumption of innocence 
Right to present a defense 
Right to counsel 
Right to public trial 
Prohibition of double jeopardy 
Right to remain silent 
Right to a timely trial 
Right to an interpreter 
Right to fair trial 
Right to appeal to higher court 
Representation right for minorities 
Autonomy for minorities 
 
Rights for prisoners 
Right to due process 
Right to equality 
Right to private property 
Right to education 
Right to work 
Right to health 
Right to social security 
Freedom of enterprise 
Right to rest  
Right to minimum wage 
Right to housing 
Right to work for the government  
Right to favorable working conditions 
Intellectual property 
Right to sport 
Right to adequate standard of living 
Prohibition of child labor 
Prohibition of confiscation 
Right to food 
Right to water 
Right to establish a family 
Rights for children 
Special protection of mothers 
Right to get married 
Equality husband and wife within the family  
Rights for elderly people 
Special protection of women  
Women empowerment in labor relations  
Right to maternity leave  
Right to a healthy environment 
Right to culture 
Protection of minority language 
Right to preserve traditional ways  
Right to asylum 
Special protection of minorities 
Rights for handicapped people  
Schooling right for minorities 
Rights for consumers 
Right for minorities to use indigenous lands 
Rights for victims of crimes 
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B. Average Number of Consitutional Rights Over Time 
 
 
Average Number of All 87 Rights over Time 
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2. Constitutional Social Rights Data 
This part presents more information on the four social rights that are analyzed in this paper. This 
information is divided into two sections: (A) the percent of countries that have each right from 
1946 to 2012; and (B) maps showing which counties have each right in 2012.  
 
A. Percent of Countries with Social Rights in Their Constitutions Over Time 
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B. Countries with Social Rights in Their Constitutions in 2012 
 
Countries with the Right to Education in 2012 
 
 
 
 
Countries with the Right to Healthcare in 2012 
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Countries with the Right to Housing in 2012 
 
 
 
 
Countries with the Right to Social Security in 2012 
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3. Summary Statistics  
This Part provides summary statistics for the dependent, treatment, and control variables used to 
study the right to education and the right to healthcare. Although the same control variables were 
used to study each right, the summary statistics are presented seperately because the possible 
samples vary due to limitations on the dependent variables. For the control variables, we present 
information on the samples with and without the use of Amelia to input missing values of the 
control variables.  
 
Summary Statistics for Right to Education 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Education Spending (% of GDP) 3,042 4.54 2.02 0 44.33 
Treatment Variable      
Right to Education 3,042 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Control Variables (with Imputation)   
Probability of Right 3,042 0.76 0.41 0 1 
Urban Population 3,042 54.83 23.60 4.11 100.00 
Population Over 65 3,042 7.71 4.90 0.59 24.40 
Inflation 3,042 16.29 86.64 -357.94 3057.63 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 3,042 8.79 1.17 5.95 12.57 
GDP Growth 3,042 2.33 4.79 -31.18 58.36 
Polity Score 3,042 3.39 6.92 -10.00 10.00 
Interstate War 3,042 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Civil War 3,042 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Control Variables (without Imputation) 
Urban Population 3,042 54.83 23.60 4.11 100.00 
Population Over 65 3,012 7.72 4.91 1.00 24.40 
Inflation 3,000 15.41 82.79 -31.57 3057.63 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 2,855 8.78 1.18 5.95 11.73 
GDP Growth 2,995 2.32 4.81 -31.18 58.36 
Polity Score 2,817 3.47 7.12 -10.00 10.00 
Interstate War 3,042 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Civil War 3,042 0.02 0.15 0 1 
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Summary Statistics for Right to Healthcare 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Healthcare Spending (% of GDP) 3,227 3.63 2.23 0.01 19.81 
Treatment Variable      
Right to Healthcare 3,227 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Control Variables (with Imputation)   
Probability of Right 3,227 0.65 0.44 0 1 
Urban Population 3,227 53.65 23.15 7.21 100.00 
Population Over 65 3,227 7.15 4.84 0.33 24.40 
Inflation 3,227 16.42 137.85 -357.94 5399.53 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 3,227 8.78 1.24 5.42 12.57 
GDP Growth 3,227 2.63 6.04 -62.47 142.07 
Polity Score 3,227 3.39 6.12 -10.00 10.00 
Interstate War 3,227 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Civil War 3,227 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Control Variables (without Imputation) 
Urban Population 3,227 53.65 23.15 7.21 100.00 
Population Over 65 3,155 7.11 4.89 0.33 24.40 
Inflation 3,173 15.58 136.79 -32.81 5399.53 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 2,705 8.68 1.25 5.42 11.81 
GDP Growth 3,166 2.63 6.08 -62.47 142.07 
Polity Score 2,780 3.49 6.44 -10.00 10.00 
Interstate War 3,227 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Civil War 3,227 0.00 0.07 0 1 
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4. Matching Results 
This Part provides additional information on the matched samples used in the primary analysis of 
the paper. This information is divided into four sections: (A) reports the balance statistics for the 
two matched samples used in the primary regressions; (B) includes information on the number of 
countries included in each of the two matched samples used in the main analysis; (C) provides 
maps illustrating which countries are included in the matched samples (countries are shaded in 
increasingly darker shades of gray as they appear in the sample in more years); (D) presents 
figures that show the disribution of the frequencies that different countries appeared in our 
matched samples. 
A. Balance Statistics 	  
 Education  Healthcare 
 
Full 
Sample 
Matched 
Sample 
 Full 
Sample 
Matched 
Sample 
Sample Size 2,356 540  3,045 886 
Treatment Units 1,792 270  2,095 443 
Control Units 564 270  950 443 
Mean Distance – Treatment Group 0.893 0.688  0.850 0.608 
Mean Distance – Control Group 0.341 0.573  0.331 0.520 
Improvement in Balance 79%  83% 
 
B. Number of Countries in the Matched Samples  
 
 Education Healthcare 
Control 41 64 
Treated 76 68 
Overall 107 107 
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C. Maps of Frequencies of Countries Included in the Matched Samples 
 
Education 
 
 
 
Healthcare 
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D. Frequecy of Countries Appearing in the Matched Samples 
These bar graphs show the number of countries that appear in the matched samples at different 
frequencies. The x-axis represents the number of observations that come from a single country in 
a matched sample. The y-axis presents the number of countries that appear at that frequency.  
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5. Results Using Data on % of Public Spending as the Dependent Variables  
This part reports the results from the regressions in Part 5.1 and 5.2 of the paper when using an 
alternative version of the dependent variable. Instead of using public spending on education and 
healthcare as a percent of GDP as the dependent variables, these regressions recreate the results 
in Tables 2 and 4 using the percent of public spending on education and healthcare as the 
dependent variables.  
Panel A: Baseline Specifications 
 
Education Health 
      
Right 0.357 -0.010 
 
(0.226) (0.138) 
Probability of Right -0.128 -0.226 
 
(0.294) (0.262) 
Urban Population 0.003 0.012 
 
(0.007) (0.010) 
Population Over 65 -0.038 -0.002 
 
(0.046) (0.018) 
Inflation 0.006*** -0.001** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.127 -0.176 
 
(0.201) (0.158) 
GDP Growth -0.019 -0.051*** 
 
(0.039) (0.018) 
Polity Score 0.027 0.009 
 (0.038) (0.021) 
Interstate War -2.454 -0.360 
 (1.931) (0.353) 
Civil War     -- -1.096* 
  (0.584) 
Spendingt-1 0.910*** 0.950*** 
 (0.038) (0.027) 
Year 0.008 -0.076 
 (0.023) (0.075) 
   Observations 350 844 
R-squared 0.850 0.809 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Without Matching 
 
Education Health 
      
Right 0.061 -0.031 
 
(0.212) (0.161) 
Probability of Right -0.391 -0.167 
 
(0.255) (0.173) 
Urban Population 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Population Over 65 -0.032* 0.028** 
 
(0.018) (0.013) 
Inflation 0.003 -0.001** 
 
(0.004) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.053 -0.048 
 
(0.117) (0.051) 
GDP Growth -0.005 -0.015** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) 
Polity Score 0.003 0.030** 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
Interstate War -0.048 -0.066 
 (0.256) (0.191) 
Civil War -0.046 -1.055*** 
 (0.252) (0.322) 
Spendingt-1 0.875*** 0.872*** 
 (0.041) (0.048) 
Year 0.016 -0.026 
 (0.015) (0.018) 
   Observations 1,482 3,045 
R-squared 0.840 0.805 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel C: Without Nominate 
 
Education Health 
      
Right -0.157 -0.135 
 
(0.208) (0.102) 
Probability of Right 
  
   Urban Population -0.000 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Population Over 65 -0.040** 0.025** 
 
(0.017) (0.012) 
Inflation 0.003 -0.001** 
 
(0.004) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.014 -0.030 
 
(0.108) (0.051) 
GDP Growth -0.006 -0.016** 
 
(0.015) (0.008) 
Polity Score 0.006 0.031*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
Interstate War 0.001 -0.066 
 (0.245) (0.189) 
Civil War 0.020 -1.048*** 
 (0.252) (0.322) 
Spendingt-1 0.879*** 0.872*** 
 (0.040) (0.047) 
Year 0.018 -0.027 
 (0.016) (0.018) 
   Observations 1,482 3,045 
R-squared 0.840 0.805 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel D: Without Amelia 
 
Education Health 
      
Right -0.294 -0.143 
 
(0.224) (0.131) 
Probability of Right 
  
   Urban Population -0.004 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Population Over 65 -0.060*** 0.034* 
 
(0.020) (0.019) 
Inflation -0.014 -0.001** 
 
(0.009) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.010 -0.081 
 
(0.112) (0.076) 
GDP Growth -0.008 -0.009 
 
(0.015) (0.007) 
Polity Score 0.010 0.033** 
 (0.015) (0.014) 
Interstate War -0.125 -0.039 
 (0.224) (0.229) 
Civil War 0.015 -1.165** 
 (0.241) (0.447) 
Spendingt-1 0.854*** 0.851*** 
 (0.047) (0.070) 
Year 0.021 -0.043** 
 (0.015) (0.021) 
   Observations 1,303 2,264 
R-squared 0.849 0.778 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E: Without Controls 
 
Education Health 
      
Right 0.518 0.426 
 
(1.217) (0.534) 
   Observations 1,920 3,227 
R-squared 0.809 0.852 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects, country fixed 
effects, and country specific time trends. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. Complete Regression Results 
This part reports the complete regression results for the results reported in the body of the paper. 
This information is divided into four sections: (A) the results reported in Part 5.2; (B) the results 
reported in Part 6.1; (C) the results reported in Part 6.2; and (D) the results reproted in Part 6.3.  
A. Results Reported in Part 5.2—Alternative Specifications  
Panel A: Baseline Specifications 
 
Education Health 
      
Right 0.031 0.023 
 
(0.056) (0.030) 
Probability of Right -0.045 -0.066* 
 
(0.056) (0.037) 
Urban Population -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.007 0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.005) 
Inflation 0.000 -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.073 -0.017 
 
(0.051) (0.020) 
GDP Growth -0.012** -0.010*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
Polity Score 0.012** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Interstate War 0.320** -0.049 
 (0.149) (0.057) 
Civil War -0.367* -0.115 
 (0.210) (0.071) 
Spendingt-1 0.934*** 0.986*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) 
Year -0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
   Observations 540 886 
R-squared 0.930 0.962 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Without Matching 
 
Education Health 
      
Right 0.028 0.025 
 
(0.037) (0.025) 
Probability of Right -0.045 -0.074** 
 
(0.042) (0.029) 
Urban Population -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Population Over 65 -0.001 0.008*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.035 -0.011 
 
(0.024) (0.010) 
GDP Growth -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Polity Score 0.001 0.003** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Interstate War 0.017 -0.012 
 (0.046) (0.041) 
Civil War 0.015 -0.093* 
 (0.085) (0.048) 
Spendingt-1 0.947*** 0.971*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Year -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   Observations 2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel C: Without Nominate 
 
Education Health 
      
Right -0.000 -0.021 
 
(0.031) (0.016) 
Probability of Right 
  
   Urban Population -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Population Over 65 -0.002 0.007*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.037 -0.005 
 
(0.023) (0.010) 
GDP Growth -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Polity Score 0.002 0.003** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Interstate War 0.018 -0.012 
 (0.045) (0.040) 
Civil War 0.013 -0.088* 
 (0.084) (0.046) 
Spendingt-1 0.948*** 0.974*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
Year -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   Observations 2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel D: Without Amelia 
 
Education Health 
      
Right -0.015 -0.027 
 
(0.032) (0.018) 
Probability of Right 
  
   Urban Population -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.001 0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.000** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.030 -0.002 
 
(0.025) (0.012) 
GDP Growth -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Polity Score 0.004 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) 
Interstate War 0.034 0.006 
 (0.049) (0.044) 
Civil War -0.006 -0.127*** 
 (0.091) (0.037) 
Spendingt-1 0.944*** 0.967*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Year 0.000 -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   Observations 2,104 2,264 
R-squared 0.913 0.963 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E: Without Controls 
 
Education Health 
      
Right -0.076 0.162 
 
(0.280) (0.115) 
   Observations 3,042 3,227 
R-squared 0.762 0.958 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects, country fixed 
effects, and country specific time trends. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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B. Results Reported in Part 6.1—Alternative Definition of Rights  
 
Panel A: Baseline Specification 
 
Excluding 
Policy Goals 
 Excluding  
Non-Judiciable Rights 
 Including Guarantees of 
Free Services 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Health 
 (3) 
Education 
(4) 
Health 
 (5) 
Education 
(6) 
Health 
                
Right 0.060* 0.003  0.054* 0.006  0.018 -0.023 
 (0.033) (0.022)  (0.032) (0.023)  (0.036) (0.022) 
Probability of Right 0.030 -0.006  0.002 -0.007  0.010 0.044 
 (0.036) (0.029)  (0.043) (0.029)  (0.043) (0.044) 
Urban Population -0.000 -0.001  0.000 0.000  -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 0.001 0.004  0.002 -0.001  0.003 0.009** 
 (0.007) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.004) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.001  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.024 0.017  0.035 0.017  0.038 0.006 
 (0.033) (0.017)  (0.033) (0.022)  (0.033) (0.023) 
GDP Growth -0.009** -0.016***  -0.007* -0.008***  -0.006* -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Polity Score 0.007* 0.005**  0.001 0.004  0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Interstate War 0.048 -0.017  0.084 0.108  -0.041 0.065 
 (0.085) (0.076)  (0.081) (0.134)  (0.069) (0.077) 
Civil War 0.077   0.010 -0.070  0.033  
 (0.169)   (0.108) (0.061)  (0.145)  
Spendingt-1 0.946*** 0.966***  0.938*** 0.978***  0.922*** 0.949*** 
 (0.013) (0.010)  (0.016) (0.006)  (0.011) (0.019) 
Year -0.003 -0.005  0.001 -0.008  0.000 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.005) 
         
Observations 1,204 1,418  1,010 1,148  1,050 1,184 
R-squared 0.916 0.960  0.921 0.973  0.921 0.950 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Without Matching 
 
Excluding 
Policy Goals 
 Excluding  
Non-Judiciable Rights 
 Including Guarantees of 
Free Services 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Health 
 (3) 
Education 
(4) 
Health 
 (5) 
Education 
(6) 
Health 
                
Right 0.035 -0.007  0.029 -0.009  0.013 -0.028** 
 (0.026) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.020)  (0.027) (0.014) 
Probability of Right -0.024 -0.034  -0.022 -0.033  -0.020 0.023 
 (0.030) (0.022)  (0.027) (0.021)  (0.033) (0.029) 
Urban Population -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Population Over 65 -0.002 0.007***  -0.002 0.007***  -0.001 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.039 -0.008  0.038* -0.009  0.036 -0.002 
 (0.024) (0.011)  (0.023) (0.010)  (0.023) (0.011) 
GDP Growth -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Polity Score 0.001 0.004**  0.002 0.003**  0.001 0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) 
Interstate War 0.020 -0.015  0.021 -0.015  0.018 -0.009 
 (0.045) (0.041)  (0.046) (0.041)  (0.045) (0.041) 
Civil War 0.014 -0.102**  0.012 -0.101**  0.016 -0.096** 
 (0.082) (0.048)  (0.084) (0.049)  (0.085) (0.046) 
Spendingt-1 0.948*** 0.973***  0.948*** 0.973***  0.947*** 0.974*** 
 (0.010) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.006) 
Year -0.002 0.001  -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Observations 2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel C: Without Nominate 
 
Excluding 
Policy Goals 
 Excluding  
Non-Judiciable Rights 
 Including Guarantees of 
Free Services 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Health 
 (3) 
Education 
(4) 
Health 
 (5) 
Education 
(6) 
Health 
                
Right 0.025 -0.022  0.018 -0.028*  0.004 -0.024 
 (0.026) (0.015)  (0.023) (0.015)  (0.025) (0.015) 
Probability of Right         
         
Urban Population -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Population Over 65 -0.002 0.007***  -0.002 0.007***  -0.002 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.041* -0.005  0.039* -0.006  0.037 -0.003 
 (0.024) (0.010)  (0.023) (0.010)  (0.023) (0.010) 
GDP Growth -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) 
Polity Score 0.002 0.004**  0.002 0.003**  0.002 0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) 
Interstate War 0.021 -0.015  0.022 -0.016  0.018 -0.011 
 (0.044) (0.041)  (0.046) (0.041)  (0.044) (0.041) 
Civil War 0.010 -0.101**  0.010 -0.094*  0.013 -0.097** 
 (0.084) (0.046)  (0.084) (0.049)  (0.085) (0.046) 
Spendingt-1 0.949*** 0.974***  0.949*** 0.974***  0.948*** 0.974*** 
 (0.010) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.006) 
Year -0.002 0.000  -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Observations 2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045  2,356 3,045 
R-squared 0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960  0.909 0.960 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel D: Without Amelia 
 
Excluding 
Policy Goals 
 Excluding  
Non-Judiciable Rights 
 Including Guarantees of 
Free Services 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Health 
 (3) 
Education 
(4) 
Health 
 (5) 
Education 
(6) 
Health 
                
Right 0.010 -0.037**  -0.003 -0.043**  -0.005 -0.038*** 
 (0.024) (0.015)  (0.024) (0.017)  (0.023) (0.015) 
Probability of Right         
         
Urban Population -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 0.000  -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.002 0.009***  -0.001 0.009***  -0.001 0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.000** -0.000***  -0.000** -0.000***  -0.000** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.033 -0.005  0.031 -0.005  0.031 -0.003 
 (0.026) (0.012)  (0.025) (0.011)  (0.026) (0.012) 
GDP Growth -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.008***  -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) 
Polity Score 0.004 0.005***  0.004 0.004***  0.004 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Interstate War 0.038 -0.001  0.036 -0.000  0.036 0.010 
 (0.048) (0.045)  (0.049) (0.045)  (0.048) (0.045) 
Civil War -0.011 -0.146***  -0.008 -0.141***  -0.009 -0.140*** 
 (0.091) (0.037)  (0.091) (0.043)  (0.092) (0.037) 
Spendingt-1 0.946*** 0.967***  0.945*** 0.966***  0.945*** 0.966*** 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Year 0.000 -0.005*  0.000 -0.005*  0.000 -0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Observations 2,104 2,264  2,104 2,264  2,104 2,264 
R-squared 0.913 0.963  0.913 0.963  0.913 0.963 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E: Without Controls  
 
Excluding 
Policy Goals 
 Excluding  
Non-Judiciable Rights 
 Including Guarantees of 
Free Services 
 
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Health 
 (3) 
Education 
(4) 
Health 
 (5) 
Education 
(6) 
Health 
                
Right 0.053 0.148  -0.300 0.055  0.043 0.001 
 (0.225) (0.096)  (0.292) (0.128)  (0.267) (0.178) 
         
Observations 3,042 3,227  3,042 3,227  3,042 3,227 
R-squared 0.762 0.958  0.763 0.958  0.762 0.958 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and country specific time trends. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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C. Results Reported in Part 6.2—Alternative Social Rights  
 
Panel A: Baseline Specifications 
 
Housing Social Security 
      
Right 0.002 0.051 
 
(0.029) (0.058) 
Probability of Right -0.048 0.072 
 
(0.038) (0.065) 
Urban Population 0.000 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Population Over 65 -0.006 0.022 
 
(0.005) (0.018) 
Inflation -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.012 0.007 
 
(0.025) (0.073) 
GDP Growth 0.001 -0.037*** 
 
(0.006) (0.011) 
Polity Score 0.003 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
Interstate War -0.038 -0.026 
 (0.037) (0.094) 
Civil War -0.036 -0.089 
 (0.040) (0.121) 
Spendingt-1 0.878*** 0.986*** 
 (0.052) (0.010) 
Year 0.006 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
   Observations 598 610 
R-squared 0.741 0.986 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B: Without Matching 
 
Housing Social Security 
      
Right -0.003 -0.041 
 
(0.025) (0.060) 
Probability of Right -0.088*** 0.059 
 
(0.030) (0.064) 
Urban Population -0.000 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Population Over 65 -0.010** 0.050*** 
 
(0.004) (0.012) 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.050* 0.026 
 
(0.030) (0.042) 
GDP Growth 0.003 -0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) 
Polity Score 0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Interstate War -0.008 -0.076 
 (0.028) (0.084) 
Civil War -0.059* -0.025 
 (0.030) (0.077) 
Spendingt-1 0.858*** 0.960*** 
 (0.024) (0.009) 
Year 0.005 0.016* 
 (0.003) (0.008) 
   Observations 1,560 1,548 
R-squared 0.757 0.982 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel C: Without Nominate 
 
Housing Social Security 
      
Right -0.038 -0.008 
 
(0.024) (0.045) 
Probability of Right 
  
   Urban Population -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Population Over 65 -0.010** 0.049*** 
 
(0.005) (0.012) 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.052* 0.024 
 
(0.030) (0.042) 
GDP Growth 0.004 -0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) 
Polity Score -0.000 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Interstate War -0.009 -0.074 
 (0.028) (0.083) 
Civil War -0.052* -0.015 
 (0.031) (0.077) 
Spendingt-1 0.862*** 0.962*** 
 (0.023) (0.009) 
Year 0.005 0.016* 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
   Observations 1,560 1,548 
R-squared 0.757 0.982 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   69 
 
Panel D: Without Amelia 
 
Housing Social Security 
      
Right -0.027 -0.009 
 
(0.021) (0.050) 
Probability of Right 
  
   Urban Population -0.000 0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Population Over 65 -0.006* 0.053*** 
 
(0.004) (0.014) 
Inflation -0.000** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) 0.036 0.031 
 
(0.023) (0.050) 
GDP Growth 0.003 -0.027*** 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
Polity Score 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Interstate War 0.023 -0.087 
 (0.021) (0.101) 
Civil War -0.052* 0.007 
 (0.029) (0.080) 
Spendingt-1 0.865*** 0.958*** 
 (0.022) (0.010) 
Year 0.005 0.018* 
 (0.003) (0.009) 
   Observations 1,339 1,322 
R-squared 0.772 0.983 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Model E: Without Controls 
 
Housing Social Security 
      
Right 0.197 0.525 
 
(0.213) (0.433) 
   Observations 1,716 1,695 
R-squared 0.706 0.970 
- Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects, country fixed 
effects, and country specific time trends. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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D. Results Reported in Part 6.3—The Effect on Education and Health Outcomes 
Panel A: Baseline Specification 
 Educational Outcomes  Health Outcomes 
  
(1) 
Education  
Intake 
(2) 
Education 
Persistence 
(3) 
Youth 
Literacy 
 (4) 
Total 
Physicians 
(5) 
Hospital 
Beds 
(6) 
Life 
Expectancy 
               
        
Right 0.052 -0.404 --  -0.006 0.104 0.004 
 (0.520) (0.592)   (0.020) (0.099) (0.040) 
Probability of Right 0.598 -1.701 --  0.017 0.050 0.062* 
 (0.760) (1.046)   (0.040) (0.124) (0.037) 
Urban Population -0.006 0.026 --  0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.017) (0.028)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.051 0.136 --  0.010 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.094) (0.129)   (0.007) (0.019) (0.005) 
Inflation -0.000** 0.000 --  0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.691 0.430 --  -0.017 0.148* -0.004 
 (0.473) (0.595)   (0.026) (0.074) (0.029) 
GDP Growth -0.003 0.060 --  0.001 0.011 0.002 
 (0.096) (0.077)   (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) 
Polity Score 0.148** 0.052 --  0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.059) (0.071)   (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) 
Interstate War 0.127 -1.534 --  -0.006 0.061 0.013 
 (1.130) (1.194)   (0.025) (0.082) (0.078) 
Civil War	   -0.328 2.757** --  0.056 0.088 0.164** 	   (0.988) (1.387)   (0.040) (0.149) (0.069) 
Spendingt-1 0.959*** 0.911*** --  0.966*** 0.967*** 1.000*** 
 (0.017) (0.038)   (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) 
Year 0.149 0.022 --  0.004 -0.004 -0.005*** 
 (0.119) (0.038)   (0.005) (0.012) (0.002) 
        
Observations 630 332   290 232 2,404 
R-squared 0.936 0.962   0.984 0.986 0.999 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
- The Regression for “Youth Literacy” is omitted because of insufficient sample size.  
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Panel B: Without Matching 
 Educational Outcomes  Health Outcomes 
  
(1) 
Education  
Intake 
(2) 
Education 
Persistence 
(3) 
Youth 
Literacy 
 (4) 
Total 
Physicians 
(5) 
Hospital 
Beds 
(6) 
Life 
Expectancy 
               
        
Right 0.127 0.109 0.327  -0.010 0.060 0.001 
 (0.315) (0.308) (0.529)  (0.010) (0.068) (0.036) 
Probability of Right 0.278 -0.085 0.059  0.017 -0.013 0.106*** 
 (0.401) (0.409) (0.378)  (0.014) (0.068) (0.038) 
Urban Population 0.007 0.022** 0.012*  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.074** 0.035 -0.024  0.006*** -0.001 -0.009*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.046)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000** -0.048**  0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.389** 0.458** -0.087  0.015** 0.053** 0.002 
 (0.191) (0.207) (0.166)  (0.007) (0.026) (0.020) 
GDP Growth 0.063* 0.020 -0.068  0.001 0.004* 0.004*** 
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.054)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Polity Score 0.035** -0.014 0.015  -0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.038)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Interstate War 0.362 -0.603 0.965***  -0.006 0.037 0.040 
 (0.679) (0.455)   (0.021) (0.036) (0.038) 
Civil War	   -0.652 0.668   -0.017* -0.044 0.090** 	   (0.706) (0.691)   (0.009) (0.030) (0.038) 
Spendingt-1 0.943*** 0.921***   0.964*** 0.963*** 0.997*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) 
Year -0.057 0.107** -0.152*  -0.002 -0.008*** -0.002*** 
 (0.082) (0.042) (0.082)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
        
Observations 3,429 2,111 95  1,683 1,405 7,778 
R-squared 0.907 0.955 0.993  0.982 0.989 0.999 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel C: Without Nominate 
 Educational Outcomes  Health Outcomes 
  
(1) 
Education  
Intake 
(2) 
Education 
Persistence 
(3) 
Youth 
Literacy 
 (4) 
Total 
Physicians 
(5) 
Hospital 
Beds 
(6) 
Life 
Expectancy 
               
        
Right 0.302 0.061 0.388  0.001 0.050 0.069*** 
 (0.273) (0.259) (0.237)  (0.008) (0.031) (0.024) 
Probability of Right        
        
Urban Population 0.007 0.021** 0.012*  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.069** 0.033 -0.023  0.006*** -0.001 -0.008** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.042)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000** -0.048**  0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.404** 0.463** -0.089  0.014** 0.054** -0.008 
 (0.186) (0.205) (0.153)  (0.007) (0.026) (0.021) 
GDP Growth 0.063* 0.020 -0.068  0.001 0.004* 0.004*** 
 (0.036) (0.025) (0.052)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Polity Score 0.033* -0.013 0.015  -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.035)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Interstate War 0.379 -0.605 0.965***  -0.007 0.037 0.039 
 (0.680) (0.454)   (0.021) (0.037) (0.039) 
Civil War	   -0.646 0.665   -0.016* -0.044 0.096** 	   (0.708) (0.689)   (0.008) (0.029) (0.038) 
Spendingt-1 0.943*** 0.921***   0.965*** 0.963*** 0.997*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) 
Year -0.057 0.106** -0.152*  -0.002 -0.008*** -0.002*** 
 (0.082) (0.042) (0.081)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
        
Observations 3,429 2,111 95  1,683 1,405 7,778 
R-squared 0.907 0.955 0.993  0.982 0.989 0.999 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel D: Without Amelia 
 Educational Outcomes  Health Outcomes 
  
(1) 
Education  
Intake 
(2) 
Education 
Persistence 
(3) 
Youth 
Literacy 
 (4) 
Total 
Physicians 
(5) 
Hospital 
Beds 
(6) 
Life 
Expectancy 
               
        
Right 0.229 0.042 0.435  0.004 0.071* 0.078*** 
 (0.297) (0.268) (0.314)  (0.009) (0.036) (0.025) 
Probability of Right        
        
Urban Population 0.006 0.014 0.007  0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population Over 65 -0.052 0.004 -0.023  0.006*** -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.049)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.000* -0.052**  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.021)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Per Capita (ln) -0.452** 0.697*** -0.052  0.011 0.061** -0.045 
 (0.228) (0.249) (0.187)  (0.008) (0.030) (0.031) 
GDP Growth 0.093** 0.004 -0.069  0.001 0.004 0.004*** 
 (0.038) (0.026) (0.058)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Polity Score 0.027 -0.002 0.018  -0.000 0.000 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.043)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Interstate War 0.657 -0.395 0.968***  -0.005 0.041 0.024 
 (0.806) (0.584)   (0.022) (0.042) (0.044) 
Civil War	   -0.043 0.799   -0.012 -0.026 0.118*** 	   (0.673) (0.736)   (0.009) (0.029) (0.035) 
Spendingt-1 0.944*** 0.920***   0.967*** 0.965*** 1.000*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) 
Year -0.070 0.081** -0.120  -0.000 -0.009*** -0.001 
 (0.091) (0.039) (0.081)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
        
Observations 2,691 1,820 80  1,474 1,220 5,702 
R-squared 0.913 0.957 0.993  0.981 0.989 0.999 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel E: Without Controls 
 Educational Outcomes  Health Outcomes 
  
(1) 
Education  
Intake 
(2) 
Education 
Persistence 
(3) 
Youth 
Literacy 
 (4) 
Total 
Physicians 
(5) 
Hospital 
Beds 
(6) 
Life 
Expectancy 
               
        
Right 2.318 2.200 4.825  -0.087* -0.179 0.496 
 (4.239) (2.188) (3.517)  (0.045) (0.158) (0.548) 
        
Observations 4,042 2,749 568  3,096 2,505 7,980 
R-squared 0.834 0.945 0.991  0.948 0.960 0.979 
- Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.  
- All models include year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and country specific time trends. 
- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
